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I. Introduction [ 6 ]
The European Community (EC) was  founded in 1957 by the Treaty of
Rome. The original member countries were Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg,  the Netherlands, and West Germany. The motivation of the
original six members  in forming the Community were both political and
economic. It was hoped that closer cooperation would reduce the
likelihood of a recurrence of  the major military conflicts that had
devastated Europe in the past. Also the prospect of a large affluent
market, free of impediments  to internal  trade and with a strong
preference for goods produced within the Community,  provided a most
attractive economic inducement.  In 1973 a northern expansion of the EC
took place, when Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the
Community of six. In the 1980's a second enlargement  of the  EC took
place, when three southern European countries joined the EC. They were
Greece  in 1981, and Portugal and Spain in 1986.
Improved productivity, fair living standards for farmers and
farmworkers, stable markets and secure supplies at reasonable prices for
the  consumer:  these are the objectives set forth in 1957 for European
agriculture.
Since 1962, the common organization of the market in  grains  is one
of  the central elements of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of  the
European Community. Traditionally the CAP has relied on the following
three principles:
(1) a common market for agricultural products, which attempts to set a
single level of price support for each commodity throughout the EC;
(2) Community preference, which ensures that EC products have a
competitive advantage over imported products; and,
(3) financial solidarity, which requires the EC to fund all CAP
activities  jointly.
The high domestic prices provided by the CAP stimulated grain
production, reduced growth in consumption, and led to the accumulation
of  large stocks. As a result, EC grain imports fell sharply and largeThe  Member  Countries  Of  The European  Community
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2export subsidies were required to dispose of  the ever  increasing surplus
production.
As  a solution to the budgetary dilemma created by the common
organization of  the market in grains, the Council of Ministers
introduced in  1986 a fourth principle into the CAP, namely the producer
co-responsibility levy, as  a response designed to control  the cost  of
grain surplus. The levy is meant "to make producers face the realities
of the market".  It also seeks to regain from farmers some of the price
support they receive for their grains.
This paper will discuss the reasons  for introducing the levy. In
addition, it  will reveal the social welfare implications  the levy has
brought along in its  path.
3II. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
A. Nature of the CAP  [ 2,4,5,8,15 ]
The CAP, as  it  has evolved, represents probably the most
comprehensive example of the management of agricultural markets  in  the
Western World. It reflects a fundamental  lack of confidence in
unconstrained market forces to achieve the kinds of objectives that EC
members would like  to see. The objectives have been spelt  out in detail
in the Treaty of Rome (Article 39) and include  the promotion of improved
agricultural incomes and of  technical and economic efficiency, the
stabilization of markets, and guaranteed regular supplies  to consumers
at reasonable prices. The choice  of a bureaucratic management approach
to agricultural policy reflects both the established history of
agricultural protectionism in Western Europe and the state of
agriculture in  the member countries at  the  time the  CAP was being
developed.
Policy on markets  and prices:  the main mechanism
Once the objectives and principles of the policy had been agreed,
the market organizations were set up. In the early days, the
organizations covered just over half the farm output of  the Six. By
1970, the proportion was 87X and, by 1986,  91%.
One of the first market organizations to be introduced was that of
grains,  in 1962. It was regarded from the beginning as a model.  It has
been adjusted in many respects, but for the purpose of an illustration,
I will confine myself to a basic outline to explain the principal
mechanism.
Target and intervention prices
The target price is  the cornerstone of the market organization. It
is  set at the beginning of each marketing year as being the farmgate
price farmers should receive in consumption areas. If  internal  supply
exceeds demand, the market price, i.e.  the price received by farmers,
generally falls below the target price. If  it  falls below a certain
limit, the Community intervenes  to stabilize the market by offering to
buy the grains at a price fixed in advance:  the intervention price. This
is  the price at which the authorities buy in grains without limit as to
quantity through agencies set up for that purpose. During  1984/85, the
4Community bought in nearly 9 million tons of common wheat  in this way,
which it  later sold. In accordance with the principles of joint
financial responsibility, the  cost of this operation was borne by the
Community.
The intervention price is well below the  target price.  It forms  a
lower limit for  internal prices and represents a kind of guaranteed
minimum price for Community farmers. It  is one of the cornerstones of
the system.
Threshold price, levies and refunds:  a sluice-gate system at the
frontiers
Community prices  for common wheat are generally well above the
prices charged by the other main wheat producers (United States of
America, Canada, and Australia).  In order to prevent the Community
market from being flooded from outside, which would result in the
complete collapse of European production, and to enable Community
producers  to participate in world trade, regulatory measures  have to be
taken at the boundaries of the Community. A threshold price is set  for
imports on which the lowest import price  (world market price + transport
to Community frontier) is aligned. The threshold prices are calculated
so that  the  prices of the imported grains at the major consumption
centers  of the Community,  including transport and unloading costs,
roughly correspond to the target prices. The difference between the
threshold price and the import offer price is  charged as a  'levy' and
accrues to the Community budget as a contribution to the Community's own
financial resources. Conversely, for exports, Community exporters are
'refunded' the differences between the market price in the Community
(including transport costs  to the Community's port of  export) and the
sale price that can be obtained on the world market. The refunds
are chargeable to the agricultural part of the budget of  the Community.
A flexible system
The sluice-gate system formed by the import  levies and export
refunds is  the second cornerstone of the market organization.  Its big
advantage is its considerable flexibility as a market stabilization
instrument. This can be  illustrated by the following example:  Let us
assume that the market price for one ton of wheat in the Community is
5Figure  1:  Basic  mechanism  of  many  EC  agricultural  support  systems
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Source:  Australian  Covernment  Publishing  Service.  Bureau  of  Agricultural  Bconomics.  Policy monograph
no.  2. Agricultural  policies  in the  European  Conunity.  Their  origins,  nature  and  effects  on
production  and  trade.  Canberra,  1985.  p. 33.
between  the  target  price  (100)  and  the  lower  intervention  price  (70)  at
80. The  import  price  is  60  and  the  threshold price  95.  The  import  price
is  increased  to  the  threshold  price  by  the  levy  (95-60=35).  The  addition
of  transport  costs  to  the  main  consumption  centers  of  the  Community
brings  the  price  of  the  wheat  there  roughly  up  to  the  target  price
(100).  Since  wheat  produced  in  the  Community  is  offered  here  at  the
domestic  market  price  (80),  Community  production  enjoys  a  clear
advantage  - a  Community  preference  of  100  - 80  =  20.
B.  The  CAP from  the  1960's  to  the  present  [  1,7,10,21  ]
Developments  in  the  EC  Grain  Sector
In  less  than  20  years,  the  EC  has  evolved  from  one  of  the  world's
largest  grain  importers  into  one  of  its  largest  exporters.  This  change
occurred  under  the  umbrella  of  a  policy  system that  provided  EC  grain
farmers  with  prices  well  above  world  market  levels  and  protected  them
from  lower  priced  imports.  The  high  domestic  prices  provided  by  the
Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  stimulated  grain  production,  reduced
6growth in consumption, encouraged the use of substitute feeds, and  led
to the accumulation of  large stocks. As  a result, EC grain imports fell
sharply and large export subsidies were required to dispose of the
surpluses on world markets.
EC grain production has increased steadily over  the last  15 years as
the Community enlarged from 9 members in the  1970's to 10  in 1981 and
then to 12  in 1986. Between  1973/74 and 1980/81, grain production in the
EC-9 grew at an annual rate of around 2%,  increasing from 105.8 million
tons to  119.6 million tons  (see table  1, p.18).
The accession of Greece in 1981 added about 5 million tons of annual
grain production. Production accelerated between 1981/82 and 1985/86,
growing at an annual rate of 4%. In January 1986, Spain and Portugal
joined  the EC, bringing an additional 17 million tons of grain
production into the Community, accounting for 11%  of  total EC-12
production in 1986/87. Grain supplies grew 3% per year between 1986/87
and  1988/89, reaching 163.4 million tons in  1988/89.
Although grain area in the EC has generally been trending downward,
its impact on production has been more than offset by substantial
improvements in yields. Average grain yields in the EC increased from
3.97  tons per hectare in  1973/74 to 4.46  tons by 1980/81, an increase of
2% per year. Although EC average yields declined slightly in 1981/82,
due mainly to the addition of Greece, they continued to  increase
steadily between 1981/82 and 1985/86, climbing from 4.34 tons per
hectare to 5.11 tons.
Because of substantially lower yields in Spain and Portugal, average
EC yields dropped to 4.33 tons per hectare  in  1986/87, but they still
continued to climb upward, reaching 4.70 tons per hectare  in 1988/89.
Since 1973/74,  the growth in grain yields has averaged nearly 3X a year.
The dramatic growth was the result of a combination of factors including
high grain support prices,  the adoption of higher yielding varieties,
more intensive fertilizer application, increased mechanization, and
improved management practices.
In contrast to the rapid expansion in grain production, EC
consumption of grain has been relatively stable. Between 1973/74 and
1985/86, consumption fluctuated in the range of  112-120 million tons.
7With the  accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986, consumption increased
by 18 million tons, but  this was  just 3 million tons more than the
corresponding increase in production, resulting in only a small decline
in self-sufficiency. Human consumption has  remained fairly stagnant,
reflecting high prices, low population growth in most EC countries, and
the limited response of food consumption to  increases in income.
Despite the steady increase  in the consumption of  animal feeds over the
last  15  years, feed use of grains has  remained fairly constant due to
high prices for feed grains,  increased use of both imported and
domestically produced oilseeds and non-grain feeds,  reduced EC dairy
herds,  and improved feed utilization in animal production.
Agricultural markets
Grains:
The  1988/89 marketing year was characterized by the changed world
market situation and its  repercussions on the Community market, as well
as by the introduction of  stabilizers. The drought  in the USA and the
period of high consumption which followed led to a decrease in stocks
and an increase  in prices which reduced the level of export refunds by
almost half. World production was  1,232 million tons  in 1988/89.
Estimates for 1989/90 put  it at 1,344 million tons.
During the last two years, world consumption of wheat has been
higher than production. EC exports reached the record  level of almost 35
million tons  in  1988/89, made up of 17.3 million tons of common wheat,
11.2 million tons of barley and 3.6 million tons of durum wheat. In
1988/89, corn exports jumped to  1.8 million tons because of increased
self-sufficiency in the Community and because of the EC-USA agreement on
annual  imports of 2.3 million tons  of corn and sorghum for the period
1987-90 (in the context of Spanish accession). Furthermore, the
consumption of corn in animal feed has fallen somewhat owing to
increased wheat consumption.
In  1988/89, grain imports were about 5 million tons,  including
Spanish imports from the USA. Imports have been relatively stable during
recent years and represent mainly, with the exception of Spanish
imports,  imports of specific qualities not available in the Community
and Portuguese imports under the current national market organization.
8In the 1988/89 marketing year, the quantity of common wheat available
for export will be substantial as a result of  increased production. On
the other hand, exports of other grains,  in particular barley and corn,
are expected to be substantially less, as a result of  lower production
and increased on-farm consumption due  to the lack of fodder in certain
regions of  the Community.
In 1989/90, global  consumption of wheat in the world is again
expected to exceed production, resulting in a further, although limited,
reduction of stocks. However, the grain area has been increased
substantially in the main exporting countries and, under normal climatic
circumstances, world production should be able to match demand and even
make  it possible to rebuild stocks in  coming years.
On the Community market, the 1988 harvest  (163.8 million tons) was
slightly below the long-term average but was a clear improvement over
the average for the last three years. The  area of 34.9 million hectares
remained at a relatively high level, being only 2.1 million ha  short of
the record for the decade (1980). The reduced area is due in particular
to a reduction in  the area sown to barley, oats and rye while the area
under corn and durum wheat has increased steadily. Yields were above
normal and the average yield was only slightly below (2%) the 1984
record.
The 1989 harvest  (160.5 million tons) was much below the long-term
trend but  still above the three-year average. The main reason for the
relatively low production was  the warm and very dry summer throughout
the Community. Nevertheless, production was higher than initially
expected, and quality was in general very good. For the first time in
five years, the grains area increased slightly (+1%), due solely to a 4%
increase in the wheat area, while the area under barley and other grains
continued to decrease. Yields were on average relatively good and only
4.5%  lower than the record level  of 1984.  However, there were
substantial  regional variations  (ranging from record to very poor
yields). The long-term trend in production depends a lot on the crop
area. This year saw an increase in the area sown to high-yielding grains
(common wheat and corn) in particular, due to conversion from oilseed
and protein crops, and if this tendency were to be confirmed production
9could increase  substantially in the coming years, because yields are
progressing at more than 2Z a year.  However, stabilizers  and set-aside
measures could keep production within the relatively low levels
registered over the  last  few years.
Consumption has decreased steadily during the  last five years, due
to decreased animal consumption and was at  its  lowest  in 1987/88. In
1988/89,  animal  consumption increased only slightly to 82.2 million tons
due to higher world market prices for grain substitutes, especially soya
cake. A figure of 80.6 million tons  is forecast  for 1989/90;  in the
longer term, the downward trend in animal  consumption of grains  is
expected to  continue as a result of  increased oilseed and protein crop
production in the Community and the  current  import arrangements for
grain substitutes and feed protein.
During the  1988/89 marketing year, producer prices were relatively
stable around the buying-in price in the main surplus regions while
keeping well above it  in deficit  regions, in  particular Italy (common
wheat). However, market prices were relatively high as a result of the
active export program.
C. The agricultural budget  [ 7,13  ]
The EAGGP: European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
The  financial instrument available to the Community for implementing
its  common agricultural policy is  the EAGGP. This fund consists of two
sections:
- the Guarantee Section, which finances measures relating to
the common organization of markets;
- the Guidance Section, which finances measures  to improve the
production, processing and marketing structures  for agricultural
products.
Over the past five years  the funds available to the Guidance Section
have  totalled 4,500 million ECU. This money is used to subsidize
investment projects  (usually at the rate of 25%, but higher rates apply
to less-favored areas, particularly in the south of the Community),  and
to finance part of the  cost general structural measures, regional
measures, and measures  to restore the balance on certain markets. The
budget of the Guarantee Section, on the other hand, covers all
10expenditure  on  market  management  (production  and  consumption,  aids,
export  refunds,  storage  costs).
Over  90% of  agricultural  production  in  the  European  Community  is
covered  by  the  common  organization  of  markets.  Under  the  market
organization,  farmers  enjoy  price  and  sales  guarantees  for  some  70% of
Table  1:  EAGGF guarantee  expenditure,  by  product
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985
Product  G  io ECU  nio  EC  a  io E8CU  io ECU  Rio  ECU  Hio  ECU
Grains  1669.3  1921.4  1824.5  2441.2  1650.0  2310.2
Refunds  (food  aid  incl.)  1174,7  1206.3  1064.9  1525.0  918.3  1076.7
Intervention,  of  which:  494.6  715.1  759.6  916,2  731.7  1233.5
- production  refund  148.1  129.2  135.4  129,7  175.5  180.8
- aid  for  durun  wheat  129.0  171.2  165.8  218.5  200.3  242.5
- storage  212.8  341.7  453.4  565.6  355.8  810.1
- co-responsibility  levy  - -
- small  producer  aid  - - - - -
Rice  58.7  21.7  50.3  92.9  47.8  50.1
Sugar  575.2  767.5  1241.9  1316.2  1631.5  1804.5
Olive oil  317.9  442.7  493.1  675.3  1096.4  692.2
Oils  and  fats  369.4  582.7  720.7  945.6  655.6  1110.6
Protein  crops  60.5  65.5  82.8  142.3  215.6  372.5
Textile  plants
and  silkworms  17.2  72.3  116.4  160.0  108.0  240.6
Fruit  &  vegetables  687.3  641.1  914.3  1196.1  1454.6  1230.7
line  299.5  459.4  570.6  659.2  1222.6  921.4
Tobacco  309.3  361.8  622.6  671.3  776.4  862.9
Other  sectors  38.2  46.7  53.4  55.6  51.5  54.6
Bilk  products  4752.0  3342.7  3327.7  4396.1  5441.7  5933.2
Beef/veal  1363.3  1436.9  1158.6  1736.5  2546.8  2745.8
Sheepueat  and  goatmeat  53.5  191.5  251.7  305.6  433.5  502.4
igeMat  115.6  154.6  111.6  145.0  195.9  165.4
Iggs  and  poultrymeat  85.5  83.9  103.9  123.3  69.8  63.2
Ion-annex  II  products  221.3  282.4  414.4  343.2  382.4  440.8
Fishery  products  23.0  28.0  34.0  25.7  15.6  16.1
Total  market  organization  11016.7  10902.8  12092.5  15431.1  17995.7  19517.2
(ACAs)  in intra-
Comunity trade  - 0.1  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.2
Ronetary  compensatory
amounts  (RCAs)  298.5  238.3  312.7  488.3  375.9  189.6
Total+ACAsMrCAs  11315.2  11141.2  12405.6  15919.7  18371.9  19707.0
Comunity  cop.  meas,  - - - 136.4
Grand  total  11315.2  11141.2  12405.6  15919.7  18371.9  19843.4
Source:
EC  Commission,  Directorate-General  for Agriculture  (various  issues  of
The  Agricultural  Situation  in  the  Community).
11Table  1:  EAGCPF  uarantee  expenditure,  by  product  (con't)
1986  (1)  1987  (1.6)  1988  (1.7)  1989  (2)  1990  (3)
Product  lio  ICU  I  Rio ECU  X  Rio eCU  I  lio  ECU SX  io ECU 
Grains  3391.2  15.3  4223.8  18,4  4422.8  15.9  4133  14.6  4505  15.8
Refunds  (food  aid  incl.)  1711.7  7,7  3156.8  13.7  3083.0  11.1  2773  9.8  2961  10.4
Intervention,  of  which:  1679.5  7.6  1067.1  4.7  1339.8  4.8  1360  4.8  1544  5.4
- production  refund  177.7  0.8  235.5  1.0  393.3  1.4  342  1.2  369  1.3
- aid  for  durum  wheat  210.8  0.9  256.2  1.1  275.1  1.0  348  1.2  437  1.5
- storage  1347.4  6,1  937.2  4.1  1274,7  4.5  1358  4.8  1808  6.4
- co-responsibility  levy  (56,4)  (0.2)  (378.7)  (1.6)  (677.5)  (2.4)  (906)  (3.2)  (1280)  (4.5)
- small  producer  aid  - - 16.9  p..  40.8  0.1  122  0.4  103  0.4
lice  93.7  0.4  103.0  0.4  88.7  0,3  121  0.4  106  0.4
Sugar  1725.5  7.8  2035.6  8.8  2081.8  7.5  2051  7.2  2127  7.5
Olive  oil  604.3  2.7  1139,2  4.9  945.0  3.4  1765  6.2  1592  5.6
Oils  and  fats  2027.5  9.1  2687.4  11.7  2971.8  10.7  2944  10.4  3422  12.1
Protein  crops  460,0  2.1  587.2  2.6  689.3  2.4  706  2.4  703  2.5
Textile  plants
and  silkworms  565.0  2.5  306.4  1.3  454.2  1.6  646  2.3  660  2.3
fruit &  vegetables  986.0  4,4  967.1  4.2  708.2  2.5  1221  4,3  1307  4,6
iine  630.8  2.8  800.3  3.5  1545.5  5.5  1466  5.2  1389  4.9
Tobacco  782.2  3.5  803.6  3.5  966.1  3,5  975  3.5  1055  3.7
Other  sectors  56.4  0.3  44.5  0.2  59.8  0.2  77  0.3  81  0.3
lilk  products  5405.8  24.4  5182.3  22.6  5983.6  21.6  4908  17.4  4489  15.8
Beef/veal  3481.7  15.7  2148.7  9.3  2475.8  8.9  2589  9.2  2187  7.7
Sheepmeat  and  goatmeat  616.9  2.8  573.8  2.5  1293.6  4.7  1454  5.2  1358  4.8
Pipeat  151.8  0.7  158.6  0.7  215.6  0.8  237  0.8  185  0.7
Iggs  and  poultryeat  97.8  0.5  152.0  0,7  194.1  0.7  221  0.8  213  0,8
Ion-annex  II  products  502.9  2.3  590.2  2.6  602.4  2.2  624  2.2  693  2.4
Fishery  products  18.0  0.1  17,4  0.1  46.9  0.2  37.3  0.1  32  0.1
Total  market  organization  21597.5  97.3  22521.1  98.1  25745.3  92.9  26175.3  92.7  26104  92.0
(ACAs)  in intra-
Comunity  trade  5.8  - 18.0  0.1  64.3  0.2  45  0.1  35  0.1
Monetary  compensatory
amounts  (MCAs)  475.9  2.1  636.9  2.7  505.2  1.9  370  1.3  136  0.5
Total+ACAs+MCAs  22079.2  99.5  23176.0  100.9  26314.8  95.0  26590.3  94.1  26275  92.6
Other  113.5  0.5  (208.0)  (0.9)  132.5  0.5  188  0.7  345  1.2
Rural  dev.  (chapter  110)  - - - - - - - 200  0.7
Set-aside  arable  land  - - - - - - 20  0.1  70  0.3
Depr.  &  disp.  of  stocks  - - 1240  4.3  1449  5.1  1470  5.2
Grand  total  22192.7'  100  22968.04  100  27687.3J  100  28247.3  100  28360  100
Source:  IC Comission,  lirectorate-General  for  Agriculture.  (1) The  Expenditure  items  are  taken  from  the  returns  made
by  the  Member  States  under  the  advance  payments  system  and  are  charged  to a given  financial  year  under  Art.  97  of  the
financial  Regulations.  (2) Budget  adopted  on  15.12.1988  (OJ  L  26,  30.1.1989).  (3) 1990  preliminary  draft  budget.  (4)
Including  ICU - 208.2  million  from  clearance  of  the  1983,  1984  and  1985  accounts.  (5) Including  ECU  - +29.2 million
outstanding  from  the  clearance  of  the  1985  and  earlier  accounts.  (6) 1987  expenditure  includes  payments  to
beneficiaries  beteen  1 January  and  31  October  1987.  (7) 1988  expenditure  includes  payments  to  beneficiaries  between
1.11.1987  and  15.10.1988.  (8) Amounts  credited  to the  'Guarantee'  Section,  i.e.  502 of  the  amount  entered  in chapter  39
of  the  budget.  (9) lot  including  BCU  - 55.3  million  from  clearance  of  the  1982  accounts  bringing  the  total  to  22137.4
million  ICU.
12their products. Agricultural expenditure accounts  for 70% of all
expenditure under the Community budget.
Expenditure and revenue
The  table below shows changes in EAGGF expenditure and net
expenditure under the CAP  (after deduction of  levies).
Table  2:  Agricultural expenditure
(lillion  ECU)
1985  1986  1987  1988  (1)  1989  (2)  1990  (3)
BACGC-Guarantee  Section  (4) 19744.2  22137.4  22967.7  27687.3  28247.3  28360.0  (6)
AGGF-Guidance  Section
(payments)  719.6  773.5  908.7  1179.5  1434.0  (7) 1751.5  (7)
Total  gross  expenditure  20463.8  22910.9  23816.4  28866.8  29681.3  30111.5
Levies  1121.7  1175.5  1626.1  1504.6  1419.2  1152.4
Sugar  levies  1057.4  1111,5  1471.8  1390.7  1316.9  1384.6
Total  net  expenditure  (5)  18284.7  20623.9  20778,5  25971.5  26945.2  27574.5
Source:  Commission  of  the  European  Comunities.  The  Agricultural  Situation  in the  Comunity.  1989  Re-
port.  Brussels,  Belgium.
NB:  1985:  EBP  10.  From  1986:  8UR  12.  (1) Including  ECU  1,240  million for  the  depreciation  of  stocks  (Chapter  81).
(2)  1989  budget  appropriations  and  supplementary  and  amending  budget  lo  1/89,  including  the  set-aside  of  arable  land
(501  of  Item  3900:  ECU  20  million),  coumon  organization  of  the  markets  in the  fisheries  sector  (Chapter  40:  BCU  37.3
million),  the  depreciation  of  stocks  and  the  disposal  of  butter  (Chapter  81:  ICU  1449  million).  (3)  1990  preliminary
draft  budget  also  including  the  set-aside  of  farmland  (50Z  of  Article  390:  ECU  70  million),  the  Fisheries  Guarantee  Fund
(Chapter  40:  ICU  32  million)  and  the  repayment  to the  lember  States  of  expenditure  for  the  depreciation  of  stocks  and
for  specific  measures  for  the  disposal  of butter  (Chapter  81:  ECU  1,470  million).  (4) Including  adjustments  resulting
from  the  clearance  of  accounts.  (5) arious  aspects  of  commercial  policy,  not  directly  linked  to  the  CAP,  also  have
financial  consequences  which  are  not  shown  separately  from  those  directly  linked  to the  CAP.  (6) Including  ECU  200
million  in Chapter  100  for  rural  development  schemes  linked  to urket  operation.
(7) Including  fisheries  and  set-aside  chargeable  to  IAGG6  Guidance  Section.
Gross  EAGGF expenditure  as  a  percentage  of  total  expenditure,  before  the
deduction  of  the  revenue  from  levies,  fell  from  72.5% in  1985  (of  which
70% for  the  Guarantee  Section)  to  70.2% (67.3%)  in  1988  and  66.2% (63%)
in  1989,  based  on  the  budget  and  supplementary  budget  No  1/89.  In  1990
the  figures  should  be  64.2% and  60.5% (55.1% after  deduction  of  the
receipts  from  import  levies  and  sugar  levies).
13III. The Producer Co-Responsibility Levy
In 1985/86  it was generally accepted that  policy reform in  the grain
sector was now essential. The  fundamental  choice facing policy-makers
was  one of reducing intervention prices or curtailing production through
physical controls. There is a common presumption that the reduction in
farm incomes which a  'realistic' price cut would produce  is  too great to
be politically viable.  ('Realistic'  means  sufficient to remove most of
the gap between EC and trend world prices, thus making any EC exports
competitive  in the international market). As a result, and  in light of
the  'success' achieved in the milk sector, there has been increased
interest recently in controlling grain production through quotas or  set-
aside, and  in the extended use of  co-responsibility levies.
The following sections of this chapter will  present the  rules and
regulations  laid down by the agricultural ministers.
A. Regulations  for the  1986/87 marketing year  [ 18 ]
The agricultural ministers' resolution of April 26,  1986, introduced
as from July 1, 1986,  the producer co-responsibility levy of 3% for
grain. The  Council followed the Commissioners' recommendation on the
whole but not in one important aspect. The Commissioners proposed that
the levy should be collected and later remitted by the first buyer of
the grain whereas the Council decreed that this should be done when the
grain is processed, exported, or sold to the intervention agencies.
One doubts whether the ministers realized at the time the full
extend of what they inflicted on the public. This shifting of  the levy
away from the first buyer of grain has created a multitude of practical,
organizational, and legal problems which were still unresolved, weeks
and months after the start of the marketing year 1986/87.  It  is to be
hoped that they recognize their deviation and that they will  return to
the Commission's initial plans in the upcoming marketing year 1987/88.
Reg. 1579/86 amending art. 4 of reg. 2727/75 introduces into the
Grain Market Regulation the grain producer co-responsibility levy which
is,  as its name implies, to be borne by the producers. The levy is
planned to last from 1986/87 until  1990/91.
The  levy is set at 5.38 ECU/ton in 1986/87  (art. 1 price reg.
1584/86) which is  3% of the  intervention price of bread wheat. The
14original calculation of the  levy was based on  the grain consumption in
the Community, the  size of the  crop, imports of grain substitutes
(appendix D of  the basic reg. 2727/75),  exports and the cost of
subsidizing them, and finally the  starch production subsidy, all of
which added up to 5.7% of the intervention price of wheat which the
Commission considered for political  reasons as being too high, and they
recommended 3% instead.
The co-responsibility levy must be realistically seen as a new
source of revenue.  It  is meant  "to make producers face the realities of
the market", though it  is debatable whether it  really needed the very
complicated and therefore costly device  of the co-responsibility levy to
achieve that aim. The major details of the co-responsibility levy are
contained in the Commission's  regulations listed below. Their conversion
into the individual  countries' internal  law required a multitude of
national publications and directives to the authorities concerned with
their implementation.
Regs. 2040/86 of June 30 and 2572/86 of August 12,  1986,
contain the directives  for the implementation of the levy,
regs. 1871/86 of June 17 and 2366/86 of July 28,  1986,
contain details of the exemptions from the levy,
regs.  1983/86 of June 24 and 2096/86 of July 3, 1986,
contain details of  the refund of the levy to small
producers.
The following is a summary of the directives contained therein:  The co-
responsibility levy of 5.38 ECU/ton applies to all kinds of grain
(except rice) harvested in the Community in 1986.  It  is  in the first
instance to run for five years until 1990/91 and to be revised each
year, with the recalculation to be based on the above criteria.
It  is being levied on grain which
- undergoes its first processing stage after July 1, 1986,
- is  taken over by an intervention agency,
- is being exported in its original state  (as kernels) to
non-Community countries or to Portugal.
The definition of the  "first processing stage" has  caused a lot  of
confusion. In general,  it means that the resulting product comes no
15longer under the heading of chapter 10 of the communal  customs  tariff
which covers all kinds of basic grains including corn cob mix and silage
corn (with corn cob mix for silage being exempt from the levy, though
not  corn silage). The  levy has  to be paid on chicken feed where the
grains remain in their original  state and are mixed with other
components. According to reg. 2040/86, the  levy is  also due  in the  case
of contract processing of the grain as  a service for and on behalf of
the farmer, be it  on the farm or elsewhere.  The levy is  to be remitted
by the processors  (millers, maltsters, compounders, starch producers and
the  like) on the quantity processed, which need not to be the  same as
the purchased quantity. The settlement between the farmer and his buyer
is  based on the standard quality, i.e.  the  levy is not payable on excess
moisture or  impurities.
The  levy must be a separate  item in each of  the invoices passing from
the  seller to intermediate and from him/her to the processor as  the
final buyer. The processors have to send their report by the 15th day of
the month following the month of processing to the designated
authorities, in Germany the customs head office, in France and the U.K.
the intervention agencies, in the Netherlands the Productschap, in
Greece the ministry of agriculture etc.,  and to remit the levies  by the
end of  that month.
The levy must also appear separately in the settlement with the farmers
so that  they may later substantiate their claim of a refund.
Because of the fact that the processor has to collect and remit the
levies and not the farmer, value-added tax was in Germany initially
calculated on the price minus the levy, similar to the procedure in
Prance and the U.K. whereas Belgium and the Netherlands always based
v.a.t. on the gross price (before deduction of the  levy). German farmer
suffered thus an additional  loss of  1.68 DM/ton ($1.00/ton) because of
their high v.a.t. rate of  13%.  The German ministry of finance decided
not before September 19,  1986,  to change retrospectively to the
procedure practiced in the Benelux countries  (Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg),  which means  that every invoice and other document passed
since July 1, 1986, will have to be corrected.
Prices quoted on the exchanges are of course without the levy (and as
16before, without the  v.a.t.).  If grain  is sold to the intervention
agencies, the intervention  price  is  reduced by the  levy of  5.38 ECU/ton.
If the agencies sell  for export or  for the home market, they do so at
the full price without deducting the levy because it was  already
collected and remitted after being purchased.
If,  however, open market grain is exported, the exporter has to pay the
co-responsibility  levy. It  is  not being offset against the export
restitution. The levy must be  submitted together with the customs
declaration and payment of  it becomes due when the export formalities
are being complied with.
The major exemptions from the co-responsibility levy are:
a) grain imported from non-Community countries or from
Portugal. Proof that  the processed goods are made from
the previously imported grain  (as temporarily demanded,
see art.  4 reg. 2040/86)  is  no longer necessary. A customs  entry
confirmation is  sufficient for an exemption certificate to be  issued.
b) Grain processed on the farm is exempt provided the processing
machinery belongs temporarily (is rented) or permanently to the
farmer and the products are consumed on the farm.
c) Extra grain needed and purchased by the farmer, be it from another
farmer or from a merchant, is  exempt.
d) Grain stocks owned on June 30,  1986, by traders, processors or
intervention agencies, in store with them and registered by July 7,
1986, at the latest, as being in their possession are also exempt
(reg. 1871/86).
Originally, the Commissioners planned  to exempt for social reasons
small producers of grain selling up to 25 tons p.a. which is,  however,
only the case in Italy and Spain. In the other Community countries,
small producers are not exempted, but  the will be compensated at the end
of  the marketing period, possibly in the  spring of 1987. Available
for that purpose are 69.99 million ECU in the remaining nine countries
including 15.19 million ECU or 36 million DM for German farmers
according to the Commissioners' distribution ratio (reg. 2096/86). The
conversion is  based on the green rates at the start of  the marketing
year.
17The subsidy for  small producers may not exceed the equivalent of the  co-
responsibility levy on 25  tons which is  at  a maximum of 134.50 ECU per
farm. To determine who is or not a small  producer (the  criterium may be
the arable land or else the grain acreage) is  a national matter, but
neither the German nor the European governments have so far indicated
how they are likely to proceed.
B. Regulations for the 1987/88 marketing year  [ 19  ]
The co-responsibility levy of  5.38 ECU/ton introduced in 1986/87 has
been maintained (reg. 1902/87), but  in the session of July 1, 1987,  the
Council of Ministers authorized the member countries to  collect the  levy
at the  first marketing stage (from the producer, as  in Italy during the
past marketing year on the basis of a regulation to that effect). The
first marketing stage  is,  according to regulation 2529/87, also the
export of grain by a producer or the processing of grain on  the farm
provided it  is  then being sold to another farmer.
Prance had been making use  of this authorization since September 1,
1987.  In intra-Community trade,  the delivery form T2 must be endorsed
accordingly so that the different levy procedures (in Prance and Italy
at the first marketing stage,  in the other EC countries either at the
first processing stage or when the grain is  exported or tendered to the
intervention agencies) do not give one country an unfair advantage over
the other.
Small producers are still exempted from the levy. They include in
Germany, for example, farmers who grow grain on  less than 15 hectares
(37 acres) or sell no more than 25 tons of grain. The levy they pay is
later refunded to them with the maximum refund amounting to DM 322.50
(134.50 ECU) per farm.
C. Regulations  for the 1988/89 marketing year [  9.17 1
The major details of the co-responsibility levy (CLR) are contained
in  the Commission's regulations  listed below. Their  conversion into the
individual countries'  internal  law required a multitude of national
publications and directives to the authorities  concerned with their
implementation.
Reg. 1432/88  (directives for the implementation of the levy)
Reg. 2227/88  (details of the refund of the  levy to small
18producers)
Reg. 2324/88  (further directives)
Reg. 2388/88 (details of  the additional CRL)
Reg. 2389/88  (subsidy for small  producers)
The major directives are in short:
The CRL of 5.38 ECU/ton applies to all kinds of grain (except rice)
grown in the Community; during its  first two years,  1986/87 and 1987/88,
the CRL was to be paid on grain which, after July 1, 1986,
- underwent its  first processing stage,
- was  taken over by an intervention agency,or
- was exported in  its original state  (as kernels) to non-
Community countries or to Portugal.
Revisions  1988/89
The system was completely revised as from 1988/89. Like the
Commission recommended for 1986/87, the  levy is  now being collected when
the grain is marketed the first time.
The Commission defines  in art.  1 reg. 2324/88 amending reg.  1432/88 the
somewhat vague term "marketing". It  takes place when the grain is sold
for the first  time
- to collectors, to trading companies or processors,
- to the intervention agencies, or
- to other farmers.
The CRL need not  to be paid if the grain is  sold to private persons for
their own consumption.
The judgement of the European Court of Justice of June 29, 1988,
relating to contract processing of grain (lawsuit No. 300/86)  has caused
much confusion. The verdict was  that the levy was not due on quantities
processed under contract during the 1986/87 and 1987/88 marketing years
as long as the processing of grain by the producer of it on his own farm
was exempted from the levy. The European Court of Justice saw in the
regulation an inadmissable discrimination of contract processors.
The Commission accepted the consequences  and prescribed in reg.
2324/88 that contract processing and processing by the producer of  the
grain should be  treated alike so that the direct usage of grain on the
farm is exempted from the levy  (and also from the additional CRL, which
19will  be described later on) as  from July 1, 1988, no matter whether the
contract processor or the grower processed the  grain.
A prerequisite is, however,  that the processed grain is being used (fed
to animals) on the farm where it was produced by the farmer who ordered
the contract processing. The exemption applies not only to contract
processing by mobile equipment but also by stationary plants  (compound
feed factories) outside the farm where the grain was grown, provided:
a) that the grain has not been sold and that  it  remained at the grower's
disposal, that the grower thus has no claim to the value-added tax
which would have been the  case,  if  the grain had been sold;
b) that the identity of the goods within a closed circuit must be
sufficiently certain. This  is,  in the view of the Commission the  case
if the same quantity of the same kind of grain and quality  (i.e. no
feed wheat instead of bread wheat)  is  returned to the producer of the
grain and is used as  feed on his  farm. It  is  therefore not necessary
to prove the identity of every single kernel. Contract processing is
the term used if the grain owned by a grower is processed by the use
of equipment not belonging to the grower but to a third person not
connected with the farm and if the equipment is worked by that person
or by his/her employees.
Apart from grain used direct on the farm or  contract processing of
grain subsequently to be used on that farm, there  exist exemptions  from
the levy for
- certified seed,
- small producers, and
- producers who have set aside at  least 30% of their arable
land and who do not sell more than 20 tons of grain.
The definition of a small producer is  not at all easy in view of  the
very heterogeneous farm-size structure in the twelve member countries.
The Council of Ministers had to decide that point by December 1, 1988.
Until then, a small producer is for example in Germany a farmer with no
more than  15 hectares agricultural area, who sells a maximum of 25  tons
of grain. The maximum subsidy for a small producer is  the CRL for 25
tons,  i.e.  134.50 ECU.
The total subsidy to small producers is,  like in the past year, 220
20million ECU, 50% for both the basic and additional CRL  (art. 2227/88),
including 59.25 million ECU for France,  27.85 million ECU for Germany,
9.81 million ECU for the U.K.,  8.85 million ECU for Denmark etc.
(appendix 1 reg. 2389/88).
Greece, Italy, and Spain are still authorized to exempt their small
producers directly from the CRL for the first 25  tons of grain.
The producer of the grain bears the cost  of the co-responsibility.
Liable to pay and legally responsible for the proper remittance of the
CRL is  the first buyer of grain  (trader, processor, or another farmer).
The amounts  collected during three months have to be remitted to the
authorities in charge  (for example in Germany to the Bundeskasse in
Bremen).
Buyers who purchase  less than 250 tons per year from producers, remit
the CRL only once a year, by July 31 of  the subsequent marketing year.
Apart from the basic co-responsibility levy of 5.38 ECU/ton, an
additional CRL of also  5.38 ECU/ton was introduced at the start of the
present marketing year,  1988/89, in case the EC production exceeds the
quantity limit  (guarantee threshold) of 160 million tons of grain (art.
4b of  the basic regulation 2727/75).
Guarantee Threshold
This guarantee threshold of 160 million tons  applies during the four
marketing years 1988/89 to  1991/92. The Commission recommended initially
a guarantee threshold of only 155 million tons,  on the strength of an
average domestic consumption 1984  to 1986 of approximately 140 million
tons and annual imports of grain substitutes of  15 million tons which
are taken into account  in the calculation of  the guarantee threshold.
The EC heads of government decided during their summit meeting in
February 1988 a guarantee threshold of  160 million tons for 1988/89.
Reg. 2388/88 fixes the additional CRL for 1988/89 at 3% of the bread-
wheat intervention price, 5.38 ECU/ton, the same as the basic CRL.
Additional Co-Responsibility Levy
The producer may, however, demand repayment of this additional  CRL
if the  1988 grain production in the twelve Community countries does not
exceed the guarantee threshold of  160 million tons. If that quantity is
exceeded by less than 3%, part of the additional CRL will be repaid but
21amounts below 0.50 ECU/ton will not be refunded nor will there be any
refund if  the  total due to any one producer is  below 25  ECU.
If a refund of the additional CRL or part thereof is  due, producers
have to claim it  from the authorities  in charge  (in Germany for example
from the main excise office). With their application, they must hand in
all sales vouchers  of the marketing year by the  end of the  first month
of the new marketing year. The repayment will then be  carried out by
December 31 according to art. 3 reg. 1432/88.
The collection of or  exemption from the additional CRL is  on the same
principles as for the basic CRL  (reg. 1432/88),  but it  should not be
overlooked that they are legally two entirely separate  taxes each of
which must be separately entered in the  records and shown separately in
the invoices. The two levies must not be  combined in one amount.
If  the guarantee threshold is  exceeded by 3% (i.e.  if production is
164.8 million tons or more),  the  entire additional CRL  (5.38 ECU/ton) is
retained by the authorities. Apart from that will the intervention
prices for the following marketing year  (as to be decided by the Council
of Ministers) be automatically reduced by 3% even if the previous
production exceeded the guarantee threshold by less  than 3%. If  the 1988
production is only slightly in excess  of the guarantee threshold, the
1989/90 intervention price will be cut by 3%.
The following is a simplified example of the effects of the  two co-
responsibility levies on producer prices:
- case of wheat production in Germany:
producer price for wheat per ton  160.09 ECU
plus value-added tax  20.81 ECU
gross price  180.90 ECU
minus basic CRL  5.38 ECU
175.52 ECU
minus additional CRL (if  the EC pro-
duction is  164.8 mill tons or more)  5.38 ECU
net price  170.14 ECU
D. Regulations for the 1989/90 marketing year [ 11,20 ]
At the February 1988 summit, EC member governments agreed to a
package of policy measures designed to limit surplus production and
rapid increases in budget expenditures  for a range of commodities
22supported by the Common Agricultural  Policy. For the grains sector, a
system of automatic price stabilizers was established and an additional
co-responsibility levy of 3% (over and above the 3% co-responsibility
already in force) was  imposed at the beginning of the  1988/89 marketing
year on all off-farm grain sales.  If  production of wheat and coarse
grains exceeds the "maximum guaranteed quantity" of 160 million tons
(set for 1988/89 to 1991/92),  support prices are automatically cut by 3%
the following marketing year.  If  the production limit  is  not exceeded,
the additional co-responsibility levy is fully refunded;  if  the limit is
exceeded by less than 3%,  the additional  levy is partially refunded on a
prorated basis.
The EC Commission estimated that grain production in 1988/89
exceeded the maximum guaranteed quantity by 2.5 million tons  or  1.6%.
Thus  intervention prices for grains were reduced by 3% for the 1989/90
marketing year and 1.4% of the additional co-responsibility levy
collected in 1988/89  (2.51 ECUs per ton) will be refunded. Due to the
cut in intervention prices for grains, the basic co-responsibility levy
(equal to 3% of the intervention price for wheat) will decline from 5.38
ECUs per ton  in 1988/89 to 5.22 ECUs in 1989/90.
From the  1991/92 marketing year, a system of  aid to small producers
in the field crop sector  (grains, oilseeds, protein crops) will replace
the  current system of aid for small grain producers. This aid is fixed
at 50 ECU/hectare in the  less favored and upland areas, and at 30
ECU/hectare in the rest of the Community. In all cases, the aid is
limited to a maximum area of  10 hectares of field crops per beneficiary.
The aid is  to be restricted to producers with less than 20 hectares of
utilized agricultural area. The measure will be financed within the
framework of market related actions of rural development.
23IV. Analysis of  the Co-Responsibility Levy
The first two chapters provided a brief overview of  the European
Community and its Common Agricultural Policy. This was followed in the
proceeding chapter by the introduction of the concept and the
regulations of the  co-responsibility levy.
The forthcoming chapter will  provide an analysis of the  co-
responsibility levy. Before starting a detailed analysis, a thorough
graphical evaluation of the  events leading to the introduction of the
levy would be appropriate at  this point.
A. Background investigation  [ 21  ]
In the early years of the Common Agricultural Policy, the European
Community was a net importer of  many key agricultural commodities.
Import  levies provided a funding source  for many Community activities.
Figure  1 illustrates  the basic  principles and effects  of the CAP. The
addition of  the domestic supply curve Si  and the import supply curve SI
yield the total supply curve St facing the Community. In the absence of
any price support the domestic price will equal  the world market price
P,. Since the central  goal of  the CAP is  the reduction of the disparity
between agricultural and non-agricultural  incomes, a new minimum import
price was introduced in the early 1960's. This threshold price P,  is set
above  the world market price  P,.  The difference between these two prices
is made up by the variable import levy. Consequently the new total
supply curve St' is  identical to Si  below Ps,  completely elastic at  Ps,
and identical to St above the threshold price. Because of the new
support price, domestic production increased, and imports declined. As
the EC is  a large country in economic terms the reduced imports have a
negative effect on the world market price. As a consequence, the world
market price declined to P.'  and the margin of the variable levy
increased. The social welfare effects of the variable  import  levy are
illustrated in figure 2. Domestic producers and the government are the
gainers, whereas  the consumers in the Community are loosing under this
kind of scheme. Overall social welfare losses  to society are shown in
the shaded areas B (efficiency loss) and D (deadweight consumption
loss).
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26change in PS  :  A  > 0
change in CS  :  A +  B +  C +  D < 0
change in  G :  C  > 0
change in  W :  B + D  <  0
Society is  worse  off as they were before the introduction of the  levy.
It  can be  said that a manipulation of  relative market prices  for
distributional reasons causes welfare  losses and very often adverse
distributional  side effects.
In the early 1980's the EC emerged as a net exporter of many key
agricultural commodities. This was due  to  technological progress in
conjunction with the CAP measures mentioned in chapter II.  Figure 3
illustrates this situation. At  the domestic support price P,  domestic
supply exceeds domestic demand. As  the agricultural  prices are supported
via import restrictions, Ps  can no longer be maintained and the  new
price now would be  Pi.  In order to prevent this, the EC introduced the
so-called  'intervention price' at which the national intervention
agencies step in to buy any excess grain production.  Pi  is slightly
lower than P,  (adjusted for transportation costs)  in order to avoid
imports when domestic supply exceeds domestic demand. For the purpose of
this graphical illustration it will be assumed that the intervention
price is equal to the  threshold price Ps with the result that the
domestic demand curve D' is identical to D above P 3 and completely
elastic at  P,. The intervention agencies purchase all the surplus
production (q,'qd').
In order for the EC to sell this excess production onto the world
market at prevailing world market prices,  the EC has to subsidize this
part of the production by the means of the export restitution. The
overall social welfare effects are illustrated in figure 4. Producers
are the only gainers in this game, while government and consumers loose.
Overall social welfare effects are depicted in the following table.
change in PS  :  A + B + C  > 0
change in CS  :  A  + B  <  0
change in  G : B + C + D + E + P +G  + H < 0
change in  W : B + D + E  + F + G + H  < 0
In conclusion it can be said that the policies introduced by the Common
Agricultural Policy do not  represent a zero sum game and that there is a
deadweight loss to society:  producers gain less  than consumers and
27Figure  3:  Intervention  Price  and  Export  Restitution
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29government loose.
The proceeding analysis in part B will present a graphical
interpretation of  the effects  of the co-responsibility  levy on the
European Community.
B. Graphical  evaluation [  12,14  ]
For many years the Common Agricultural Policy has relied heavily on
the following three principles:
1. a common market for agricultural products;
2. Community preference; and,
3. financial solidarity.
In 1986, a fourth principle has been introduced into  the Common
Agricultural Policy, namely the co-responsibility levy. The  levy was
adopted by the Council of Ministers  to limit the budgetary expenditure
on grains produced  in the Community. In the case of grains  two levies
apply. A base levy, amounting to 3Z  (5.38 ECU/t) of the intervention
price is  augmented by a supplementary levy of the same magnitude (i.e.
3%, or 5.38 ECU/t).  Both levies are collected from individual producers
at the first point of sale, but the supplementary levy is  refundable if
the Minimum Guaranteed Quantity (MGQ) of  160 million tons is  not
exceeded. However, farmers who produce less  than 25 tons of grain are
exempted from the levy. If the MGQ is exceeded, there  is  also a deferred
price penalty in that the following year's intervention price is
automatically reduced by the amount of the supplementary levy. The
social welfare effects of the co-responsibility levy are illustrated in
figures 5 and 6. For simplification only one levy is  assumed. In figure
5, producer gains have been reduced by the introduction of the levy. The
overall  reduction of the producer surplus will finally depend on the
magnitude of  the levy or levies. However, assuming 'one levy',  the
overall  social welfare effects are tabulated below.
change in PS  :  Ps'  B E P,  > 0
change in CS  :  Ps  I E P,  < 0
change in  G :  H  B  C  G  < 0
P,  I H P'  > 0
change in  W : B C E + I E G  < 0
Figure 6 assumes price formation and trade under the assumption that
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the  domestic  support price  and  the  co-responsibility  levy  are  given.  For
demonstrational  purposes the  analysis  will  be  undertaken  under  two
scenarios.  Under scenario  1,  producers  are  faced with  a  co-
responsibility  levy  on  total  production.  Therefore  they will  receive
price  Pd-t on  all  grains  produced,  and  production will  be  at  Q,.  The
associated  producer  surplus  can  be  found in  area  A.  Consumers,  on  the
31other  hand,  pay  a  price  of  Pd  and  obtain  in  return  quantity  d. Consumer
surplus  can  be  found  in  area  E.  Community  outlays  consist  of  export
restitution  less  the  receipt  of  the  co-responsibility  levy.  This  is
pictured  in  areas  D-(B+C).
However,  for  social  and  political  reasons,  the  Council  of  Ministers
decided  to  exempt  small  producers  which  produce  less  than  25  tons  of
Figure  6:  Price  Formation  and  Trade  with  Co-Responsibility
Domestic  Supply  &  Demand  Exports
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32grains per year. The effects of this policy are illustrated in scenario
2. It is  estimated that about 40% of domestic production would be
exempted from the co-responsibility levy, due to the decision of the
Council. This will mean, that 40%  of the grain production will receive a
price of  Pd,  whereas the remaining 60% will receive a price of Pd-t  or
Pf.  The consumer price remains unchanged, which will leave the  consumer
surplus area untouched. Government outlays, on the contrary, will be
increased from D-(C+B) to D-C, because of  the effects of the exemption
of small producers from the levy. In contrast to scenario 1, producer
surplus losses have been reduced at the expense of the Community budget.
For the purpose of this illustration, area B has been depicted as the
loss  in revenue due to the exemption. Overall,  it can be said, that the
introduction of the co-responsibility levy has reduced the budgetary
outlays  to some degree. It  is  hoped, that this  trend will continue in
the future. The following segment of this chapter will look at  the levy
from an empirical point of view using the  1988 production year.
C. Empirical estimation  [  3,7,17  ]
The  results of this investigation are derived using standard partial
equilibrium comparative static analysis in the Marshallian economic
surplus framework. In order to simplify the analysis, only the wheat
sector of the Community will be considered here. The year of the
analysis is calendar 1988. The Agricultural Situation in the Comnunity,
Commission of the European Communities, and Toepfer International,
Hamburg, were used as a source for production, consumption, and price
data. Supply and demand elasticities were taken from OECD. The basic
analytical structure of the model is  represented by equations (1)
through (5):
(1) net social loss in production
NSL  = 1/2 tp 2 ,  V ,
(2) net social loss in consumption
NSL,  = 1/2 t, 2 nd W ,
(3) welfare gain of producers
Gp  =  Q ( Pp  - P,  ) - NSLS  ,
(4) welfare loss of  consumers
Gt  =  C (  P,  - P, )  +  NSL  ,
33(5) government expenditure
G = X ( P,  - Pp  )  ,
where Q is  production at domestic prices;  P,,  border prices;  Pp,  prices
faced by domestic producers;  Pc, prices faced by domestic consumers;  te
and tp,  proportion of  tariff in domestic price at the consumer  (t,)  or
the producer  (tp)  level;  ns,  elasticity of domestic supply;  nd,
elasticity of domestic demand; V, value of domestic production at  Pp;  W,
value of  consumption at P,;  C, consumption at domestic price;  and, X,
exports from the Community.
The analysis will be undertaken using four scenarios. Under the base
scenario, no  co-responsibility levy is  assumed. The second case  includes
the base levy, which is followed in the third case by the inclusion of
the base levy and 50%  of the additional  levy. The fourth case  contains
the full amount of both levies.  In addition, the analysis will present
two elasticities of supply of  .46 and .80, respectively. The  four
scenarios will be presented first, followed by a discussion of  the
results.
(1) Base scenario (no co-responsibility levy is assumed)
Production  :  75,494,000 tons
Intervention price  : 179.44 ECU/ton
Consumption  : 63,708,000 tons
Consumer price  : 179.44 ECU/ton
Exports  : 11,786,000 tons
CIP Rotterdam price  : 100.12 ECU/ton (12 months average)
Value of production (V) : 13,547,000,000 ECU
Value of  consumption (W):  11,432,000,000 ECU
ns : .46  n, : .80  nd  : -.17 tp  : .442  t¢  : .442
(1)  NSL  = 1/2 t2 N V
= (1/2)  (.442)2  (.46)  (13,547,000,000)
NSLp  =  608.717.000 ECU
= (1/2)  (.442)2  (.80)  (13,547,000,000)
NSL  =  1.058.638.000 ECU
(2)  NSLC =  1/2 t  2 nd  W
= (1/2)  (.442)2  (-.17)  (11,432,000,000)
NSLe  =  -189.839.000 ECU
(3) Gp  =  Q ( Pp  - P, )  - NSL
= 75,494,000  (179.44-100.12) - 608,717,000
34Gp = 5.379.483.000 ECU
= 75,494,000  (179.44-100.12) - 1,058,638,000
Gp  = 4.929.562.000 ECU
(4) G,  = C ( P,  - Pc  ) + NSLC
= 63,708,000  (100.12-179.44) + (-189,839,000)
G,  = -5.243.139.000 ECU
(5) G = X ( P,  - Pp  )
= 11,786,000 (100.12-179.44)
G = -934.870.000 ECU
Total welfare loss to society:  798.556.000 ECU  (n s = .46)
Total welfare  loss to society:  1.248.477.000 ECU  (ns  = .80)
(2) Second scenario  (the basic levy of  5.38 ECU/ton is  introduced, but
production does not exceed the MGQ of  160 million tons;  40% of
production is exempted from the levy)
Production  : 45,296,400 tons @  174.06 ECU/ton
:30,197,600 tons @ 179.44 ECU/ton
Consumption  : 63,708,000 tons @ 179.44 ECU/ton
Exports  : 11,786,000 tons
CIF Rotterdam price  : 100.12 ECU/ton (12 months average)
Value of  production (V) : 13,303,000,000 ECU
Value of  consumption (W):  11,432,000,000 ECU
: .46  nf : .80  d :  -.17  tp  : .425 (for 174.06  ECU/ton)
t:  .442 (for 179.44 Ecu/ton)  tc : .442
(1)  NSLp = 1/2  tp2  ns V
= (1/2)  (.425)2  (.46)  (7,884,300,000) = 327,543,000 ECU
= (1/2)  (.442)2  (.46) (5,418,700,000) = 243,482,000 ECU
NSL  = 571.025.000 ECU
= (1/2) (.425)2  (.80)  (7,884,300,000) = 569,641,000 ECU
= (1/2)  (.442)2  (.80) (5,418,700,000) = 423,448,000 ECU
NSL  = 993.089.000 ECU
(2) NSL:  = 1/2 t, 2 n  W
= (1/2)  (.442)2  (-.17) (11,432,000,000)
NSLc  =  -189.839.000 ECU
(3) Gp = Q ( Pp - P, ) - NSLp
= 45,296,400 (174.06-100.12) - 327,543,000
= 3,349,200,000 - 327,543,000 = 3,021,657,000 ECU
= 30,197,600 (179.44-100.12) - 243,482,000
35= 2,395,300,000 - 243,482,000 =  2,151,818,000 ECU
Gp  =  5.173.475.000 ECU
= 45,296,400 (174.06-100.12) - 569,641,000
= 3,349,200,000 - 569,641,000 =  2,779,559,000 ECU
= 30,197,600 (179.44-100.12) - 423,448,000
= 2,395,300,000 - 423,448,000 = 1,971,852,000 ECU
Gp  =  4.751.411.000 ECU
(4) G,  = C (  P,  - P,  )  + NSL,
= 63,708,000  (100.12-179.44) +  (-189,839,000)
G,  = -5.243.139.000 ECU
(5) G = X (  Pw  - Pp  )  +  levy revenue
= 11,786,000  (100.12-179.44) +  (45,296,400) (5.38)
G = -691.180.000 ECU
Total welfare loss  to society:  760.860.000 ECU  (n  =  .46)
Total welfare  loss  to society:  1.182.928.000 ECU (n 8 =  .80)
(3)  Third scenario (the MGQ has been exceeded by 1.5%  (total production
of  162.4 million tons);  the basic levy (5.38 ECU/ ton) and half of the
additional levy  (2.69 ECU/ton) will be retained by the authorities;  40Z
of production is exempted).
Production  :  45,296,400 tons @ 171.37 ECU/ton
:  30,197,600 tons @ 179.44 ECU/ton
Consumption  : 63,708,000 tons @  179.44 ECU/ton
Exports  : 11,786,000 tons
CIP Rotterdam price  : 100.12 ECU/ton (12 months average)
Value of production (V) : 13,181,100,000 ECU
Value of consumption (W):  11,432,000,000 ECU
n, : .46  n  : .80  nd  : -.17  tp  : .416 (for 171.37 ECU/ton)
: .442 (for 179.44 ECU/ton)  t, : .442
(1) NSL  =  1/  2 2  V
= (1/2)  (.416)2  (.46)  (7,762,400,000) =  308,966,000 ECU
=  (1/2)  (.442)2  (.46)  (5,418,700,000) =  243,482,000 ECU
NSLp = 552.448.000 ECU
=  (1/2)  (.416)2  (.80)  (7,762,400,000) 
= 537,322,000 ECU
= (1/2)  (.442)2  (.80)  (5,418,700,000) = 423,448,000 ECU
NSL = 960.770.000 ECU
(2) NSLs  =  1/2 t,2  n  W
=  (1/2)  (.442)2  (-.17) (11,432,000,000)
36NSLe =  -189.839.000 ECU
(3) Gp  =  Q (  Pp  - P, )  - NSLP
= 45,296,400 (171.37-100.12) - 308,966,000
= 3,227,400,000 - 308,966,000 = 2,918,432,000 ECU
= 30,197,600 (179.44-100.12) - 243,482,000
= 2,395,300,000 - 243,482,000 =  2,151,818,000 ECU
G  =  5.070.250.000 ECU
= 45,296,400 (171.37-100.12)  - 537,322,000
= 3,227,400,000 - 537,322,000 =  2,690,078,000 ECU
= 30,197,600  (179.44-100.12) - 423,448,000
= 2,395,300,000 - 423,448,000  =  1,971,852,000 ECU
Gp  =  4.661.930.000 ECU
(4) GC  = C ( P,  - PC  ) + NSL 
= 63,708,000  (100.12-179.44) +  (-189,839,000)
Ge  = -5.243.139.000 ECU
(5)  G =  X ( P,  - Pp  )  +  levy revenue
= 11,786,000 (100.12-179.44) +  (45,296,400) (8.07)
G =  -569.330.000 ECU
Total welfare  loss to society:  741.610.000 ECU  (  . = .46)
Total welfare loss to society:  1.150.609.000 ECU (n  =  .80)
(4) Fourth scenario  (the MGQ has been exceeded by 3% (total production
of 164.8 million tons);  the basic levy (5.38 ECU/ ton) and the
additional levy (5.38 ECU/ton) will be retained by the authorities;  40%
of production is exempted;  in addition, the following year's price will
be reduced by 3%).
Production  :  45,296,400 tons @ 168.68 ECU/ton
:  30,197,600 tons @ 179.44 ECU/ton
Consumption  :  63,708,000 tons @ 179.44 ECU/ton
Exports  : 11,786,000 tons
CIP Rotterdam price  : 100.12 ECU/ton (12 months average)
Value of production (V) : 13,059,300,000 ECU
Value of consumption (V):  11,432,000,000 ECU
, : .46  : .80  : -.17  tp  : .406 (for 168.06 ECU/ton)
t  :  .442 (for 179.44 ECU/ton)  t, : .442
(1) NSL  =  1/2 tp 2 n,  V
= (1/2)  (.406)2  (.46)  (7,640,600,000) =  289,673,000 ECU
= (1/2)  (.442)2  (.46)  (5,418,700,000) =  243,482,000 ECU
37NSLp  =  533.155.000  ECU
=  (1/2)  (.406)2  (.80)  (7,640,600,000)  =  503,778,000  ECU
=  (1/2)  (.442)2  (.80)  (5,418,700,000)  =  423,448,000  ECU
NSL  =  927.226.000  ECU
(2)  NSLC  =  1/2  tc2 n  W
=  (1/2)  (.442)2  (-.17)  (11,432,000,000)
NSLC  =  -189.839.000  ECU
(3)  Gp  =  Q  (  Pp  - P  )  -NSLp
=  45,296,400  (168.68-100.12)  - 289,673,000
=  3,105,500,000  - 289,673,000  =  2,815,827,000  ECU
=  30,197,600  (179.44-100.12)  - 243,482,000
=  2,395,300,000  - 243,482,000  =  2,151,818,000  ECU
Gp  = 4.967.645.000  ECU
=  45,296,400  (168.68-100.12)  - 503,778,000
=3,105,500,000  - 503,778,000  =  2,601,722,000  ECU
=  30,197,600  (179.44-100.12)  - 423,448,000
=  2,395,300,000  - 423,448,000 
= 1,971,852,000  ECU
Gp  =  4.573.574.000  ECU
(4)  G c
= C  (  P,  - PC  )  + NSL,
=  63,708,000  (100.12-179.44)  +  (-189,839,000)
G  = -5.243.139.000  ECU
(5)  G  = X  (  P,  - Pp  )  +  levy  revenue
=  11,786,000  (100.12-179.44)  +  (45,296,400)  (10.76)
G  =  -447.480.000  ECU
Total welfare loss  to society: 722.994.000  ECU  (n,  =  .46)
Total welfare loss to society:  1.117.065.000  ECU (na  =  .80)
Recapitulating  the  above  results:
Elasticity  of  supply:  .46
pG  cc  ISLp  ISLC  6  Total  Welfare
Loss
lase  scenario:  5,379,483,000  -5,243,139,000  608,717,000  -189,839,000  -934,870,000  798,556,000
2. acearie  :  5,173,475,000  -5,243,13t,000  511,025,000  -119,839,000  -691,10,000  160,864,000
3. seeurio  :  5,070,250,000  -5,243,139,000  552,448,000  -189,839,000  -569,330,000  742,287,000
4. scenario  :  4,967,645,000  -5,243,139,000  533,155,000  -119,839,000  -447,480,000  722,994,000
38Elasticity  of  supply:  .80
Gp  Gc  ISLp  OSLC  C  Total  Welfare
Loss
lase  sceario:  4,929,5(2,000  -5,243,139,000  1,058,638,000  -189,839,000  -934,870,000  1,248,477,000
2. sceurio  :4,751,411,000  -5,243,139,000  993,089,000  -189,839,000  -691,180,000  1,182,928,000
3. scenario  :4,661,930,000  -5,243,139,000  960,770,000  -189,839,000  -569,330,000  1,150,(09,000
4. scenario  :4,57,57574,000  -5,243,139,000  921,226,000  -189,839,000  -447,480,000  1,117,065,000
The  results  of  the  above  analysis  are  not  without  controversy.  While
the  method  is  widely  used,  there  is  in  fact,  a  considerable  body  of
literature  and  an  ongoing  theoretical  debate  regarding  the
appropriateness  of  using  the  underlying  utility  functions  in  evaluating
welfare  gains  and  losses.  However,  as  a  tool  of  welfare  economics,  it
demonstrates  theoretically  that  it  is  usually  a  very  good  approximation
to  the  appropriate  welfare  measures.
As  the  results  of  the  analysis  demonstrate,  the  introduction  of  the
co-responsibility  levies  have  somewhat  eased  the  burden  placed  on  the
Common  Agricultural  Policy.  As  a  consequence  of  the  levy,  domestic
producers  witnessed  a  reduction  in  the  producer  surplus.  Nonetheless,
domestic  consumers  experienced  no  benefits  from  this  change,  since
consumer  prices  in  the  Community  remained  unchanged.  Government,  on  the
other  hand,  was  able  to  reduce  its  budgetary  expenditure.  However,  the
budgetary  outlays  presented  in  the  analysis  do  not  take  into  account
storage  costs  and  other  types  of  producer  aids,  and  are  therefore
grossly  underestimated.  For  example,  storage  costs  alone  exceeded  1.2
billion  ECU  in  1988.  This  translates  to  over  500  million  ECU  for  the
wheat  sector  alone.  If  no  co-responsibility  levy  is  assumed,  total
expenditure  for  the  wheat  sector  would  exceed  1.5  billion  ECU.  But,  for
simplicity  reasons,  these  outlays  have  been  omitted  from  the  analysis.
An  increase  in  the  elasticity  of  supply  will  not  only  affect
the welfare  gains  of  producers,  but  also  the  total  welfare  losses  to
society.  A  change  in  the  elasticity  from  .46  to  .80  increased  total
welfare  losses  36% under  the  base  scenario,  and  54X  when  both  levies
were  applied.  In  sunmary,  the  choice  of  elasticity  is  crucial  in
determining  the  outcome  of  the  estimation.
39Overall,  the above scenarios have demonstrated, that the co-
responsibility levy was able to reduce the net social  welfare  losses to
society.
The proceeding part D of  this chapter will appraise the co-
responsibility levy and the effects  it has on the grain sector of the
European Community.
D. Appraisal of the co-responsibility levy
The co-responsibility levy, adopted by the Council of Ministers in
1986, is  a policy designed to control the cost of grain surplus. The
basic goals of the levy can be summarized as follows:
- to make producers responsible for financing all or part of the
expenditure of surplus disposal;  and,
- to make producers more aware of the realities of the market.
As mentioned before in chapter III,  the basic levy and the
additional levy are applied at the point of first sale, rather than on
all grains produced in the Community. This was done  for simplification
of administrative controls and to encourage the use of Community
produced grains  (rather than imported substitutes) on farms. The
exemption of the first 25 tons was included to take account of the
social implications of the levy, particularly its effect on the incomes
of  structurally weaker farms. It was also a political decision to set
the basic levy and the additional levy at 3% each. This size of the levy
falls far short of covering the total export subsidies. Warren and
Brookes1 estimated in 1985 the size of the levy to be charged in order
to make the co-responsibility levy pay for all the surplus production.
In their opinion, the levy charged would have been about 9% on the
intervention price if total production was considered. However, if  the
exemptions granted by the Community are included, the levy charged on
marketed grain would increase to over 12% of the intervention price. It
is  unlikely that a levy of this size would ever be  introduced on a flat
rate basis, and the Commission itself made it  clear that applying a levy
I  Warren, R. M. and G. J. Brookes. Cereals in the EEC. Policy
options and their impact on the UK market. Dept. of Agric.
Econ., Dept. of Agric. Marketing, Univ. of Newcastle upon
Tyne, UK. Discussion Paper (No. DP 15),  December 1985.
40equal  to  the  total  cost  of surplus  disposal  is  a  'long-term  objective'
rather  than  something  which  should  be  done  immediately.  As  a  consequence
of these actions,  the co-responsibility levy will cover only 43% of the
costs  of surplus grain production in the Community in 1990. Nonetheless,
this is  a noticeable improvement over the previous years. The following
table will illustrate  this.
Table  1:  Export  refunds  and  co-responsibility  levy  receipts
(MIO  ECU)
1987  1988  1989  1990  (1)
Export  refunds  3,156.8  3,083.0  2,773  2,961
Co-responsibility
levy  receipts  378.7  677.5  906  1,280
Z covered  by  levy  12  22  33  43
(1)  1990  preliminary  draft
Source:  Data  taken  from:  Commission  of  the  European  Community.
The  Agricultural  Situation  in  the  Community.
1989  Report.  Brussels,  Belgium.
Export  refunds  between  1987  and  1990  have  been  steady at  around  3
billion ECU  per  year.  On  the other  hand,  levy  receipts  have  increased
from  378.7  million  ECU  in  1987  to over  1.2  billion  ECU  in  1990.  The
corresponding  increase  in  the  Z  coverage  by  the  levy  increased  from  12%
in  1987  to  43Z  in  1990.  It  is  estimated  that  it  will  take  until  the
1995/96  marketing  year  before  the  co-responsibility  levy will  be  able  to
cover  all  the  expenditure  created  by  the  export  refunds.  On  the  cost
side  of  the  equation,  the  co-responsibility  levy  has  decreased  the
budgetary  expenditure  of  the  surplus  production  of  the  European
Community.
On  the  contrary,  the  co-responsibility  levy  has  not  yet  had  any
major  effects  on  the  production  decisions  of  Europe's  farmers.  Actually,
over  the  past  three years,  production  has  increased  by  no  less  than  10
million  tons,  due  in  part  to  the  accession  of  Spain  and  Portugal.  The
41stabilizer mechanisms in conjunction with the co-responsibility  levy do
not appear to be having any major effects on production. The
Commission2 expects that the area planted to grains could increase and
yields will certainly increase during the next few years. The main
reason for a larger than expected boost to grain production is  that the
price cuts  imposed on rapeseed and other oilseeds - over 20% in two
years - is much greater than the reduction in grain support prices. The
trend of arable area being switched out of grains into oilseeds is
therefore likely to be reversed. This  could lead again to higher surplus
production, which in turn could increase the budgetary expenditure on
the grain sector in the European Community. As long as the Community
cannot balance both sides  (cost and production) of the equation, the
final goal of  the co-responsibility levy might never be reached.
In summary, the advantages  and disadvantages of the  co-
responsibility levy may be listed as  follows3 :
advantages
- because the co-responsibility levy raises funds the effective
reduction in price to the producer in order to meet a specific
budgetary target does not have to be as great as it would have to be
with a  'straight' price cut.  It has been estimated that every 1%  of
the levy would bring in four times more to the budget than would be
saved by a  X1  price cut;
- the idea of  'co-responsibility'  has a  'community' feel;
- there is a potential for exclusion and special cases;  and,
- producers are seen to be contributing to their own upkeep.
disadvantages
- it can be costly, and for some products difficult to collect;
- under certain circumstances the levy can also be a tax on
consumers (this would be the case, if  the Council raises the
2  Agra Europe No. 1323. February 3, 1989.
3  Warren, R. M. and G. J. Brookes. Cereals in the EEC. Policy
options and their impact on the UK market. Dept. of Agric.
Econ., Dept. of Agric. Marketing,  Univ. of Newcastle upon
Tyne, UK. Discussion Paper  (No. DP 15),  December 1985.
42institutional CAP prices to offset the incidence of the levy on
producers);  and,
- if institutional prices are  increased or world market prices fall,  the
co-responsibility levy must be adjusted accordingly or it will  no
longer cover the cost of disposal.
The proceeding chapter of the paper will  close this analysis of the
co-responsibility levy with some concluding remarks.
43V.  Concludinr  Remarks
The common organization of the market in grains is one of the
central elements of  the Common Agricultural Policy of the European
Community.  The objectives  of the policy are the advancement of
agricultural incomes, technical and economic efficiency, and the
stabilization of markets. This is  accomplished through a system of
international and intersectoral  income transfers. These relocations  from
the nonfarm to the farm sector take on many different forms,  the most
important of  these being indirect income transfers, also referred to as
'invisible transfers',  since consumers are forced to pay higher than
world market prices for agricultural products.
Today, even more so than in the past, these schemes generate not
only high budgetary expenditure for storage and  inferior use of surplus
products, they also create international trade distortions. Despite the
fact that these strategies have been employed for a long time,  it hasn't
really succeeded in resolving the original and persistent problem, which
is  the reduction of the income disparity between the farm and the
nonfarm sector.
As a solution to the budgetary dilemma created by the  common
organization of the market in grains, the Council of Ministers
introduced in 1986 the co-responsibility levy, as a response designed to
control  the cost of grain surplus. However, this instrument  (it was
decided that the co-responsibility levy was, to begin with, to run until
1991/92) is more  likely to be a short-term solution, since  it does not
really address the problem of overproduction. Consequently, the
authorities in the Community will have to look at other options  (i.e.
limited support payments, direct income transfers,  etc.) as an
alternative for solving the Community's problems.
As a concluding remark it can be said, as long there is no guarantee
that prices finally prevailing at  the market place will actually lead to
market balance, the mere reduction of subsidies, or the imposition of
the co-responsibility levy do not  solve the basic production,
distribution, and income problems of the European Community.
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